Abstract. In the field of Business Process Management formal models for the control flow of business processes have been designed since more than 15 years. Which methods are best suited to verify the bulk of these models?
Introduction
In the field of Business Process Management during the last two decades several languages have emerged which are recommended for the modelling and execution of business processes. Examples are the languages EPC, BPEL, BPMN, YAWL or several components of UML [KNS1992, AND2003, OMG2009, AH2005, BRJ2005] . While some of these languages like EPCs (Event-driven Process Chains) or UML (Unified Modeling Language) are often used in commercial projects, others stay mainly in the academic domain.
With the term Boolean process model we denote a model of the control flow of a process, which employs rules of propositional logic to describe the branching of the control flow. A simple example is an alternative specified by an XOR-rule or an OR-rule. All languages mentioned above have constructs to model the activities of a process. The languages support the necessary process primitives sequence, iteration, alternative and parallelism. Some languages can even more, they are able to model distributed process states. These languages are used therefore to design Boolean process models.
The languages enjoy different degrees of formalization. In general their syntax is well-defined but often the semantics is ambiguous or lacks completeness. Therefore several authors have undertaken the effort to translate these languages to a reference language with a well-defined semantics. In most cases Petri nets or transitions systems are used as reference language.
Petri nets have been invented at around 1960. They had a formal semantics right from the beginning. The language of Petri nets does not only support the design of a static process model. Due to their token concept Petri nets are capable to simulate also the temporal development of a process, its runs. The language has enough expressive power to serve as a reference language for EPCs, BPEL, BPMN and the process languages of UML. The language YAWL (Yet Another Workflow Language), based on Petri nets too, extends ordinary Petri nets by constructs to deal with process patterns involving multiple instances, advanced synchronisation patterns, and cancellation patterns, see sect. 4.3 in [AH2005] .
Safeness of a Boolean system follows easily from the safeness of its skeleton. The skeleton is obtained by forgetting all colours of the Boolean system. A strongly connected skeleton is a T-system. The verification of T-systems is a well-established task. Much more difficult is the question of liveness of a Boolean system. High-performance algorithms to check liveness of a problem have to circumvent the state explosion problem. The number of reachable states increases exponentially with the size of the system. Strongly connected Boolean systems arise from T-systems by adding Boolean expressions as guard formulas to specify the different firing modes of the transitions. To check liveness of a safe Boolean system we proceed as follows:
First we translate the behaviour of the Boolean system to formulas from propositional logic. Then we check the satisfiability of these formulas. What is closer related than these two procedures?
Our approach is an example of model checking. This method follows the principle to formalize "system enjoys property" as "system's semantics is model of formula" [Esp1994] . In general the formulas in question have to be taken from modal logic. However, to analyze liveness of Boolean systems it is sufficient to employ propositional logic only, which is an elementary theory. No use of any modal operator is necessary.
Model checking of a safe, strongly connected Boolean system starts with applying prefix theory to the skeleton. One obtains a finite complete prefix of its unfolding. By adding colours the prefix extends to a Boolean net. One has to consider a finite set of base markings on it and to check deadlock freeness and liveness for each of the resulting base processes.
We have implemented our model checking algorithm by a java program and tested its performance on a standard notebook with 2.53 GHz. Our implementation of the model checking algorithm shows a performance of some seconds per model with about 25 Boolean transitions and 30 places. Of course this result is not yet comparable to the time range of milliseconds reported in [FFJ2009] . At this stage the performance bottleneck is our simple SAT-solver written on the basis of the resolvent algorithm. Of course the SAT-problem is NP-complete, nevertheless the first step to enhance the performance of our model checking implementation would be to link one of the SATsolvers from the SAT research community. 
Figure 1: EPC Loan request
The EPC of the process "Loan request" has been taken from Fig. 1 in [MA2008] and slightly adapted. In a similar form it has been considered before in Abb. 4.31 from [Rum1999] . The process is described in [MA2008] as follows:
"The start event loan is requested signals the start of the process and the precondition to execute the record loan request function. After the post-condition request is recorded, the process continues with the function conduct risk assessment after the XOR-join connector. The subsequent XOR-split connector indicates a decision. In case of a negative risk assessment, the function check client assessment is performed. The following second XOR-split marks another decision: in case of a negative client assessment the process ends with a rejection of the loan request; in case of a positive client assessment, the conduct risk assessment function is executed a second time under consideration of the positive client assessment. If the risk assessment is not negative, there is another decision point to distinguish new clients and existing clients. In case of an existing client, the set up loan contract function is conducted. After that, the AND-split indicates that two activities have to be executed: first, the sign loan contract function; and second, the offer further products subsequent process [...] . If the client is new, the analyze requirements function has to be performed in addition to setting up the loan contract. The OR-join waits for both functions to be completed if necessary. If the analyze requirements function will not be executed in the process, it continues with the subprocess immediately [...]."
While the process starts with a unique event "Loan is requested" it ends with one or more of the three events "loan request is rejected" (E1), "loan contract is completed" (E2) and "client got further offer" (E3). E.g., not both events E1 and E2 can happen. The modeller intended either E1 or the combination of E2 and E3 as possible final events. The process comprises a loop which is executed whenever the client is assessed positively but his requested loan is considered too risky. Note the subtle logic of the connectors after the function "conduct risk assessment: Either the event "negative risk assessment" happens or the event "positive risk assessment". In the latter case, the event "requester is new client" may occur in addition.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 recalls some fundamental concepts from the theory of ordinary Petri nets, in particular their prefix theory. Section 3 introduces the class of Boolean systems, a subclass of coloured Petri nets. We will use Boolean systems as a reference language for Boolean process models in general and EPCs in particular. Section 4 introduces the colouring of prefixes and the base processes of a safe Boolean system. We present a model checking algorithm as the main result of our paper. We apply the results in section 5 to the verification of EPCs. The paper continues in section 6 with comparing our method to the methods above proposed for the verification of EPCs. The paper ends with an outlook to future research.
We assume that the reader is familiar with the theory of ordinary Petri nets.
Ordinary Petri nets and their processes
For the convenience of the reader and to fix the notation we recall some fundamental concepts from the theory of ordinary Petri nets, see also [DE1995] .
A finite ordinary Petri net is a pair ( )
comprises a finite set P of places, a disjoint finite set T of transitions and a set ( ) ( )
µ is named the initial marking of the net. The support of the marking µ is the set
of all places marked at µ . We will often dispense with an explicit notation for the set of places and transitions of a net and use the shorthand N x ∈ to denote a node T P x ∪ ∈ . For a node N x ∈ we denote respectively by
and x exists.
For a net N the firing rule defines the firing of a transition: A transition T t ∈ is enabled at a marking µ of N iff each place from its pre-set ( ) t pre is marked at µ with at least one token.
Being enabled, t may occur or fire. Firing t yields a new marking ' µ , which results from µ by consuming one token from each pre-place of t and by producing one token on each post-place of t ; this is denoted by '
A finite occurrence sequence from µ is a sequence 
has a reachable marking which enables t . A Petri net is bounded iff there exists a natural number which bounds from above the token content of every place at every reachable marking. If the bound can be chosen equal to 1 , then the Petri net is named safe.
A simple class of ordinary Petri nets are marked synchronization graphs or T-systems. They are important for the present investigation because T-systems will be the skeletons of strongly connected Boolean systems introduced in Chapter 3.
Definition (T-system)
A net N is a T-net if all places have exactly one pre-transition and exactly one post-transition, i.e.
( ) ( )
with N a T-net.
If the firing of a finite occurrence sequence formed by all transitions from σ is a T-invariant. Each T-invariant of a connected 
An occurrence net is a net A maximal co-set ' B with respect to set inclusion is called a cut of ON .
Causal and occurrence nets are the technical means to abstract from the concept of an occurrence sequence with a well-determined order of firing its transitions to the concept of a process, which does no longer distinguish between occurrence sequences differing only by the interleaving of their transitions. A further step is the introduction of branching processes which represent in compact form a set of alternative processes. And the final step is to prove the existence of a unique maximal branching process which is named the unfolding of the original Petri net.
Definition (Processes and branching processes)
Consider a Petri net ( ) Each safe Petri net has an unfolding which is uniquely determined up to isomorphism [Eng1991] . In general the unfolding is an infinite net. But the unfolding of a safe Petri net always has finite complete prefixes [McM1995] . They serve as a substitute for the unfolding, because they represent each reachable marking and the firing of each transition, which can occur in the original Petri net.
Definition (Complete prefix)
Consider the unfolding
is complete iff
• for every reachable marking µ of ( ) It is the first condition in Definition 2.3, which will be relevant for the model checking algorithm in Chapter 4. The first condition assures that each reachable marking of the Petri net is already reachable by a subprocess of a complete prefix. 
Example (Finite complete prefix)

Boolean Systems
In the following we denote by BOOLE the set of all formulas from propositional logic over a fixed alphabet. In particular, these formulas contain the logical connectors AND ( ∧ ), XOR ( A Boolean net arises from an ordinary net with unbranched places by adding
• to each transition of the ordinary net a Boolean formula as guard formula which specifies different firing modes of the transition
• and to each place of the ordinary net a second colour of low tokens.
Boolean systems are a simple class of coloured Petri nets. For the purpose of the present paper we do not need to enter into the general theory.
Definition (Structure of a Boolean System and skeleton)
i) A Boolean net is a tuple
• An ordinary net 
Forgetting all colours induces a canonical morphism of Petri nets
.
In case a place has both an outgoing and an ingoing arc, we will always annotate both arcs with the same variable. In case a place has exactly one ingoing and exactly one outgoing arc, the arc annotation will be positioned in figures inside the place. A transition BN t ∈ with a unique pre-place and a unique post-place is named an unary transition. Besides its low binding an unary transition has a unique high binding. Transitions with either two pre-places and a unique post-place or with a unique pre-place and two post-places are named respectively closing or opening binary transitions. Without loss of generality we will often restrict to Boolean systems with only binary and unary transitions. For the purpose of verification we can even skip the unary transitions.
Definition 3.1 requires that the initial marking of a Boolean system BS comprises at least one high token. Otherwise no action would take place in the process represented by BS .
Note.
Readers interested in the formal definition of a Petri net morphism are referred to [Weh2006] .
Example (Boolean system)
i) Figure 3 shows the scheme of a binary Boolean transition and explains its guard formula and the resulting binding elements. The column "Bindings" in Table 1 looks ahead to Definition 3.3.
Logical type
Guard formula
] 
Definition (Binding elements of a Boolean net)
Consider a Boolean net , and by producing at each post-place
Definition (Firing rule of a Boolean system)
and a low-token
. This is denoted by
has a well-defined low binding 
, of binding elements such that
..., , 
) ... 
, is enabled at dead µ . The Boolean system BS is free from synchronization deadlocks iff no reachable marking is a synchronization deadlock.
Liveness of a binding element ( ) ( )
, is a much stronger condition than high-liveness of the corresponding transition BS t ∈ . Theorem 3.11 will make precise the equivalence of highliveness and the absence of synchronization deadlocks. However, verifying that all binding elements of a transition are live requires more refined methods from model checking, see Proposition 4.8, ii). Our correctness criterion for Boolean systems is well-behavedness in the sense of Definition 3.6.
Definition (Well-behavedness)
A Boolean system BS is well-behaved iff it is safe and live with respect to all its high bindings; otherwise BS is named ill-behaved.
We will see that verification of safeness is the easy part. Any discrete Petri net morphism 
Definition (Lifting property of a morphism)
A Petri net morphism To decide if a morphism has the lifting property is not an easy task in general. For the skeleton of a Boolean system Lemma 3.9 solves the lifting problem. Because BS is free of synchronization deadlocks, the marking µ enables a binding 
Lemma (Lifting property of the skeleton)
Corollary (Skeleton of a safe and high-live Boolean system)
A safe and high-live Boolean system BS is strongly connected. 
Model checking of Boolean systems
In the present chapter we combine the theory of finite complete prefixes with the propositional logic of Boolean transitions to derive a model checking algorithm for Boolean systems BS , see Algorithm 4.9. Our investigation is based on the skeleton morphism
which has been introduced in Definition 3.1, iv). We first apply the prefix theory to 
BN BS =
with a live and safe skeleton.
• The concept of the successor graph of reachable base markings permits us to split arbitrary occurrence sequences of a safe Boolean system BS into occurrence sequences of fixed length.
Their length depends only on the choice of a finite complete prefix of an unfolding of skel BS . Each of these fragmented occurrence sequences of bounded length can be studied with one of the base processes.
Remark (Permutation of occurrence sequences)
We recall that an enabled transition of a T-system loses its firing concession only by firing itself. This fact applies to the skeleton of a Boolean system BS and generalizes to binding elements of BS : Consider a fixed Boolean transition BS t ∈ . An enabled binding element ( ) ( ) t B b t ∈ , loses its concession only by firing itself or by the firing of another enabled binding element of the same transition t . As a consequence, Lemma 3.24 in [DE1995] about the permutation of occurrence sequences in T-systems applies mutatis mutandis also to occurrence sequences of BS . Preparing our model checking algorithm we now attach to BN BON →  : cov a series of formulas from propositional logic, which represent certain behavioural properties of the system, see Table 2 and Definition 4.6. The satisfiability of these formulas is equivalent to the presence or absence of these properties. The column "Property" in Table 2 µ .
Lemma (Characterization of reachability)
• For a marking 1 µ of BON we define its reachability formula with respect to ( ) • For a binding element ( ) ( )
, of a Boolean transition t of BN we define its enabling formula with respect to ( ) 
Remark (Reachability and satisfiability)
With the notations of Definition 4.6: According to Lemma 4.5 the reachability of Apparently, binary opening transitions do not have any synchronization deadlocks. As a consequence their deadlock formula is the constant false . Table 3 shows the deadlock formulas of binary closing Boolean transitions of different logical type. Their arc annotations refer to Figure 3 . The column "Distinguished enabling formula(s)" will be referred to when explaining Algorithm 4.9. Output:
Logical type Deadlock formula Distinguished enabling formula(s)
• List of Boolean transitions of BS which suffer a synchronizing deadlock.
• List of transitions of BS which are not live with respect to all their high bindings. 
Output result
We will now discuss in detail the different steps of algorithm 4.9.
i) The T-system However, this equality does not hold for any minimal finite complete prefix. Because a live and bounded T-system is cyclic, each finite process 1 pr of In the example from Table 3 ) Algorithm 4.9 has to investigate possible synchronization deadlocks. The check is performed as satisfiability check according to Proposition 4.8, i).
vi) After verifying that the Boolean system BS is free of synchronization deadlocks we can apply the lifting Lemma 3.9. As a consequence, from each reachable marking of BS a marking is reachable, which marks the pre-place of a given opening transition of BS with a high token. The marking therefore enables all high-bindings elements of the transition.
Similarly, each high binding element of a closing transition of logical type AND or XOR is live: Always a marking is reachable, which marks a given pre-place of the transition with a high-token, the other pre-place with a second token and such that the transition is not in a synchronization deadlock.
Only for closing transitions of logical type AND_XOR, XOR_AND and OR a separate investigation is needed. Table 3 shows those enabling formulas ( ) b t Enabl , which Algorithm 4.9 has to check according to Proposition 4.8, ii).
Application to EPCs
One of the first questions, which comes up when checking a given EPC for correctness, is:
• Which are the boundary events of the EPC?
An EPC must be either without any boundary nodes or it must be bounded by events, having at least one in-event and one out-event. That's a syntactic property which can be easily checked. Inevents are initial or triggering events. But in case of loops also inner initial events may exist. Similarly are out-events the terminal or goal events of the process. And in case of loops also inner terminal events may exist. The situation becomes more difficult when the EPC has more than one single in-event or more than one single out-event. In that case the second question is:
• Which combinations of in-events and which combinations of out-events are intended by the modeller of the EPC?
This question can no longer be answered by a syntactical analysis. In general it cannot even be answered by a semantical analysis. Instead the answer must be known before any semantical analysis can start. Sometimes the boundary events of the EPC are annotated by process indicators referring to processes at the next higher level of a hierarchical process model. Then the possible combinations of the boundary events derive top-down from the possible event combinations within the process model one level higher. But often such a model is lacking. To clarify the intention of the modeller in this case, one can use an algorithm to generate a proposal for the possible event combinations. The algorithm applies mirror reflexion to both the first logical connectors after the in-events and the last logical connectors before the out-events. However, if the modeller is not a hand and his intention cannot be read off from the name of the events, the model checker himself has to make an educated guess.
After these two questions have been answered, the verification of the EPC continues with adding a start/end-connection: We introduce a separate event "start/end" and connect this distinguished event by arcs and logical connectors to all intended combinations of start events. Similar we connect all intended combinations of end-events by logical connectors and arcs with the distinguished event. After this kind of short-circuiting the resulting EPC should be strongly connected. Otherwise the structure of the EPC is considered to be faulty. All following steps of the verification will presuppose a short-circuited, strongly connected EPC.
Most easy is the verification of AND/XOR EPCs. These are EPCs with logical connectors of type AND or XOR only. To define the semantics of AND/XOR-EPCs and for their verification no Boolean systems are necessary. Instead the EPC translates to a free-choice system: Events translate to places, functions to transitions, while logical connectors of type AND translate to transitions and logical connector of type XOR translate to places. Possibly some additional unbranched places or transitions have to be introduced for syntactical reasons. Each place which represents a start event gets marked with a token. The resulting ordinary Petri net is a free-choice system. It defines the free-choice semantics of the EPC [Aal1999] . Algorithms to verify liveness and safeness of free-choice systems resulting from AND/XOR EPCs are well-established, see Theor. 4.2 in [ES1990] or Theor. 5.8 in [DE1995] .
Of course the free-choice semantics of an AND/XOR-EPC can also be obtained from its Boolean semantics, which results from translating the EPC into a Boolean system: Events translate to Boolean places, functions into unary Boolean transitions, while logical connectors of type AND and XOR translate to Boolean transitions of the corresponding logical type. Each in-event produces a high token on the corresponding place. In addition low tokens have to be added such that the skeleton is live and safe. If the resulting Boolean system BS is restricted to the flow of high tokens then the free-choice system high BS , which defines the free-choice semantics, is obtained, see [SW2010] . Now we address general EPCs with logical connectors of arbitrary type. The type may differ from AND or XOR.
Example (Closing OR-connector)
The example from Figure 8 shows an EPC with a closing OR-connector. The modeller has provided the EPC with a single in-event and a single out-event. Therefore it is straightforward for the model checker to short-circuit the EPC.
Due to the OR-join the EPC from Figure 8 does not translate to a free-choice system as long as the difference between XOR and OR is respected. However, after translating the OR-connector to a Boolean transition of logical type OR the Boolean semantics of this EPC is well-defined. In addition Algorithm 4.9 verifies that the resulting Boolean system is well-behaved.
We are now returning to our running example "Loan request" from Figure 1 . We collect all steps for its verification that we have developed in this paper.
Example (Loan request)
The EPC "Loan request" from Figure 1 has a logical connector of type different from AND or XOR. The verification of the EPC proceeds along the following steps:
• Translation of the EPC into a strongly-connected Boolean system • Verifying that the skeleton skel BS is safe and live.
• Applying Algorithm 4.9:
o Determination of a finite complete prefix The Boolean system is deadlock free, but its closing Boolean transition 4 t of logical type OR is not live with respect to all its high-bindings. After changing its logical type to AND_XOR the Boolean system becomes well-behaved, see Table 5 . Table 4 and Table 5 the meaning of the German words is "nicht = not", "und = and". The authors of [MA2008] have employed a subtle logical construct to provide the EPC with an opening AND_XOR-connector. They used a combination of two XOR-and one opening ANDconnector, Figure 9 (left hand side). To close the alternative the authors did not use the formally analogous construction with two XOR-and one closing AND-connector, Figure 9 (middle). The closing construction would have been erroneous, because it does not synchronize the decisions made at the indicated two XOR-splits in Figure 9 (middle). Instead the authors use one OR-join to close the AND_XOR alternative Figure 9 (left hand side). But one of the three firing modes of the closing OR will never be activated.
Different from the authors of [MA2008] we therefore consider the EPC from Figure 4 ill-behaved. In accordance with the above model checking result we propose to model the EPC with a pair of AND_XOR-alternatives like in Figure 9 (right hand side).
As a final example we consider an EPC from [DVV2006] proposed by the authors as a visualization of their method of EPC verification.
Example (EPC describing the EPC verification process)
The EPC from Figure 10 illustrates the verification procedure from [DVV2006] Figure 10 : EPC describing the EPC verification process, see [DVV2006] The EPC has three in-events "EPC ready to be verified" (S1), "Possible combinations of initial Events" (S2) and "Allowed final Markings" (S3) as well as five out-events "EPC is correct and executable" (E1), "EPC can be correct. Further investigation necessary" (E2), "EPC is incorrect, Problem has to be solved" (E3), "Initial Events are known" (E4) and "Possible final Markings known" (E5). From their annotation the reader cannot read off all intended combinations. But the translation of the EPC to a Petri net in [DVV2006] , Fig. 3 , achieved by the modellers themselves shows, that surprisingly some of these events are not intended as boundary events at all. The pair of events E4 and S2 as well as E5 and S3 seem to be annotations intended as hints for the human reader. The two components of each pair should therefore better be linked by two functions "t" and "u": Therefore we assume that the EPC intended by the modeller looks like Figure 11 . It has a single in-event (S1) and an XOR-combination of the three out-events E1, E2 and E3. 
OR from Figure 11
When the authors from [DVV2006] translate the EPC to a resembling Petri net, they transform the OR-join 11 OR in Figure 12 to a closing transition and the OR-join
12
OR to a closing place. And they transform the XOR-join 1 XOR from Figure 11 to a closing place too. The authors do not give any justification for these transformations. In particular they do not explain why they skip the difference between the OR-join and the XOR-join. 
Conclusion and Outlook
We start comparing our proposal for the model checking of Boolean process models with the results of the related papers named in the introduction from section 1, see In our opinion the main differences between the methods from No. 1 to 5 compared to method 6 are the following:
• Method 6 considers a Boolean process model as a high-level construct and uses the high-level language of Boolean systems from the class of Coloured Petri nets. The other methods, which also use Petri nets as a reference language, always employ ordinary Petri nets.
We think that the branching of the control flow as logical AND-, XOR-, OR-, AND_XOR-and other types of splits and joins cannot be adequately modelled by low-level constructs. Apparently each high-level Petri net can be flattened into an ordinary Petri net. But during this step much information gets lost which better should be kept together.
• Different from method 3, which is the only other model checking method from Table 8 , method 6 uses model checking on high-level Petri nets. In our opinion high-level systems should be checked with high-level methods -as long as it is possible. For Boolean systems even the elementary means of propositional logic are sufficient.
• In our approach from [LSW1998] the semantics of an EPC is defined as the semantics of the corresponding Boolean system. Due to the concept of low-tokens the semantics is the usual Petri net semantics which is well-defined for each type of logical constructor.
To the best of our knowledge we do not know other correct semantics of EPC constructs like the OR-join or the AND_XOR-join. We are well aware of different proposals in the literature, but often the proposed semantics is a global semantics and therefore seems at risk of the "vicious circle" [Kin2006] .
• Tool support for method 6 is under construction. At present we are working on an interface between the tools CPN and Eclipse, in order to export Boolean system from CPN to Eclipse, the run-time environment of our implementation of Algorithm 4.9. We plan to link also a fully developed SAT-solver.
The theory of branching processes has been generalized from its original target of ordinary Petri nets to branching processes of high-level Petri nets [KK2003] . Different from this approach, which is based on low-level occurrence nets, our concept of a base process from Definition 4.1 studies a given high-level system by means of another high-level net, which is the colouring of a low-level occurrence net.
